Conference on Disarmament

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English only

Subsidiary Body 4: Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (NSA)

Draft report

1. By decisions CD/2119 of 19 February 2018 and CD/2126 of 27 March 2018, the CD established five subsidiary bodies with a view to making progress on its agenda items. It was agreed that Subsidiary Body 4 would deal with **effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons** (negative security assurances - NSA).

2. This report constitutes an abstract of the discussions that took place in this body pursuant to its mandate:

- Part I reflects the discussions with the general focus on NSA and the external input provided by experts at the request of the CD.
    - Part I. A identifies possible areas of convergence and commonalities in the CD by taking into consideration all relevant views and proposals past, present and future.
    - Part I. B summarizes the detailed discussions held with focus on the role of NSA in the general non-proliferation and disarmament context.
    - Part I. C reflects the consideration of effective measures, including legal instruments for negotiations.
- Part II identifies possible areas of further work on the basis of the discussions in Subsidiary Body 4.

3. Taking into account the mandate of CD/2119 Subsidiary Body 4 benefited from the participation and input of four experts, namely John Borrie, senior fellow at UNIDIR, Paul Ingram, Executive Director at BASIC, Marc Finaud, senior researcher at GCSP and Lukasz Kulesa, Head of the Warsaw branch of the European Leadership Network. Upon the request of some member states John Borrie and Marc Finaud produced a matrix of existing NSA which was shared, presented and discussed during the 12 June session of the subsidiary body and is attached to the background which was submitted by the coordinator in his own capacity as a proposal for the structure of the discussions.

I. Part I.

A. Possible areas of convergence and commonalities

- Delegations acknowledged the positive effect of NSA on the policies of non-nuclear weapon states not to aspire, develop, acquire or possess nuclear weapons and thus on the non-proliferation regime and disarmament in general
- NSA were seen as possible practical steps contributing to overall and general global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, not constituting an end in itself but rather a pragmatic step to the final goal of a world without nuclear weapons
- States noted that NSA could act to reinforce and strengthen other disarmament instruments and measures
- Nuclear weapons free zones were seen as measures that could be more effective if respective protocols with applicable provisions were signed by all relevant states
- States considered the CD as the most appropriate forum to discuss NSA and their context

B. Substantive discussions

4. Subsidiary Body 4 on NSA provided states a forum and opportunity to present their views and explain underlying policies and motivations pertaining to NSA. Interactive discussions reflected the various priorities of the international community and focused mainly on general considerations, the possible impact of NSA on the non-proliferation regime and nuclear disarmament, the impact of NSA on global and regional security, general and specific obligations arisen from NSA, the possible role of NSA as confidence building measures as well as scope of NSA and linked conditionalities (in the form of reservations and exceptions, in particular with regard to art. 51 of the UNCharter), reciprocity, transparency and verification issues. The point was made that NSA should be designed to provide sufficient assurances, as appropriate, by Nuclear Weapon States to Non-Nuclear Weapons States against to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that the NPT constituted the most suitable context for negotiating new and universal NSA. The view was also expressed that this should be done in a more universal manner (everyone to everyone). Special attention was given to existing legal forms of NSA as anchored in nuclear doctrines, unilateral declarations, UNSC resolutions with particular focus on UNSCR 984 as well as treaties on nuclear weapon free zones. Discussions followed the structure proposed by the coordinator in his letter and background paper of June 12-th (attached) 2018.

5. The point was made that the matrix on existing NSA produced jointly by GCSP and UNIDIR is informative and a background for future discussions and refinement.

C. Consideration of effective measures

6. There was an in depth discussion as to the effectiveness of existing NSA's and their legally binding impact. Nuclear weapons free zones treaties were generally perceived as effective, if respective protocols with applicable provisions are signed by all relevant states. Thus special consideration was given to the universalization of existing NWFZ and the possible creation of new ones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. A range of views was delivered regarding the perceived need to constantly update and clarify nuclear doctrines, unilateral declarations and, as appropriate, to review respective UNSC-resolutions on NSA. States also discussed the feasibility and relevance of a stand-alone, comprehensive, legally binding instrument on NSA and the possibility of integrating existing and new NSA into other legal instruments and frameworks.

II. Part II.: Further work on the subject

7. The point was made that various aspects of NSA merit further consideration and should thus be deepened and further explored, notably possible additional measures and legal instruments, including legally binding. It was suggested that respective discussions, within a structured process in the CD, should take place in due course (if mandated accordingly).

8. For consideration of the CD the point was made that further focused discussions on NSA would be informative and conducive to building trust and confidence in the current international security environment. Against the backdrop of an increasingly challenging global security context they could be seen as an effort in the search for undiminished security for all at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

Annex

Negative Security Assurances
Background Paper [1]

Introduction

This background paper aims to reflect the discussions on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (NSAs) in the subsidiary body on agenda item four (SB 4), established under CD/ 2119 and CD/2126, which were held during its two meetings on the afternoon of 22 May 2018 and the morning of 24 May 2018 respectively. Previous discussions in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on this issue were duly taken into account as well, notably the discussions held in accordance with decisions CD/1978 and CD/2021 establishing a schedule of activities for the 2014 and 2015 sessions of the CD and with decision CD/2090 on the establishment of a working group on the 'Way Ahead' for the 2017 session of the CD. In providing an overview of these discussions, focusing particularly on areas of commonalities and points of convergence, the paper is meant to support the work of SB 4 to efficiently build its work on the efforts undertaken so far and thus help to further consolidate and develop the ongoing considerations on NSAs. As such this paper cannot claim to be exhaustive.

Definition and purpose of NSAs

In the context of global security and nuclear disarmament, NSAs are pledges by nuclear weapon States (NWS) to assure non-nuclear weapon States (NNWS) against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (NW). Thus, the main purpose of NSAs is the assurance of security and safety of NNWS and their populations from nuclear attacks and threats thereof, thereby strengthening the incentive for and the norm of non-proliferation.

1. General Considerations

1.1. NSA's general contribution to

1.1.1 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

It was argued by many delegations that, as NSAs are designed to provide confidence to NNWS, as they give an incentive for those States to not aspire, develop, or possess NW themselves. In that regard most delegations acknowledged the general positive impact of effective NSAs on both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In the context of the former they notably stressed their significant role in strengthening the objectives and reliability of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On the other side, NSAs were seen as a practical step contributing to overall global nuclear disarmament efforts, not constituting and end in itself, but rather an intermediary step to the final goal of a world free of NW.

1.1.2. Regional and global security

Many delegations stressed that the need for undiminished security for all was a major concern when addressing current imbalances in the global and regional security contexts..

Most delegations stressed that NSAs would render both regional and global security benefits. NSAs were considered providing an incentive to NWS to reduce their reliance on NW and the salience of these weapons in prevailing security doctrines. In this respect, some delegations mentioned that the so reduced role of NW and the so reduced incentives of NNWS to acquire NW would decrease the threat of nuclear war and improve the general global security level. In this way NSA would equally help to protect states' vital security interests. In addition, some delegations indicated that NSAs as well as the

[1] NB: This background paper aims to be an account of discussions in the CD and is not meant to reflect the national position of Germany.

related processes itself would constitute an important confidence building measure (CBM), which would also increase global security and stability and enhance the prospects for risk reduction measures.
In addition, NSAs were seen as reinforcing the interconnectedness between peace, security and the development agenda with benefits for each of these goals. In this context delegations acknowledged that disarmament and development have an intrinsic link, as recognized inter alia in the final consensus document of the UN General Assembly (GA) of its first Special Sessions devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-I).
Furthermore, the point was made that, by alleviating the insecurities regarding NW and diverting the scarce resources spent on military expenditure to development activities, NSAs could contribute to the implementation of the 2030 Development Agenda. Some delegations noted that the discussions on the principles of international humanitarian law should also be taken into account as they see the use of NW as contrary to peace and security as such.

1.2. Requirements to ensure that NSAs remain an intermediate step towards a nuclear weapon free world

There was general agreement that NSAs constitute an intermediate step towards nuclear disarmament. Numerous delegations stated in this context that the only absolute guarantee for not being targeted by NW was their total elimination. They underlined that the objective of achieving NSAs was therefore not an end itself, but a valuable interim step on the way towards the shared goal of global zero thus contributing to the total elimination of NW. The key feature of this step was described by many delegations as facilitating the general nuclear disarmament process through the creation of trust and confidence.

1.3. Specific benefits in terms of security, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation for

1.3.1 NNWS

There was wide spread agreement that NNWS have the right to be assured that their survival and security will not be jeopardized by States that possess NW. In this context NSAs were assessed on the primacy of the security of people and it was indicated by some that any nuclear attack on a State that does not possess similar response capabilities was strategically and morally unacceptable. NSA should also contribute to their interest in global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The point was made that notwithstanding the obligations that NNWS have to fulfill in the NPT context, the salience of NW and nuclear elements in national defence postures of NWS were increasing.

1.3.2. NWS

As NSAs could help to reduce their salience of NW in military doctrines and increase transparency they were perceived as having a positive impact on global security and and thus reducing nuclear dangers among NWS in particular. It was further mentioned by some delegations that the conclusion and implementation of NSAs would not cause additional financial burdens and therefore would be a rather cost-free exercise for NWS

1.3.3. Deployed forces

Some mentioned that with regard to the important safety benefits, which are provided through NSAs, and thus the reduced risk of being drawn into a global nuclear conflict, the security of deployed forces of NWS abroad (in NNWS) would also be enhanced.

2. Obligations

2.1. General obligations for NWS (as part or not of nuclear Alliances)

It was indicated that with regard to the efficiency of NSAs, NWS have to make sure that these assurances are clearly reflected and properly communicated in their domestic and foreign policy as well as in their military doctrines and nuclear postures. Some delegations asked in this context to lower the level of ambiguity in existing doctrines. Other delegations mentioned the necessity to balance the perceived need by NWS to have an element of ambiguity in their nuclear doctrines and the desire by NNWS to have clarity and transparency on the nuclear policies of NWS, including the respective doctrines. The point was further made for the need of agreed and coherent multilateral NSAs as well as consistency between declaratory policies and behavior by those granting NSAs. It was stressed that all

NWS would need to discuss measures relating to reducing the role of NW in their respective security doctrines and policies. Some voiced that the starting point for discussions on NSAs should be among States that have nuclear deterrence doctrines. In this context, others pointed out that military doctrines were sovereign national matters and could thus not be subject to international negotiations.
NWS of the NPT noted that with the unilateral pledges made in Security Council Resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995), the consensus final document of SSOD–I, their commitments undertaken through the respective protocols of the existing NWFZs, and by accepting NSAs as an agenda item in the CD, they have already acknowledged their 'global' obligations to grant NSAs and provided sufficient guarantees for NNWS which are party to and in full compliance with NPT obligations.
However, some argued that the lack of progress on concluding a universal legally binding international instrument formed a risk to the credibility and relevance of the existing NSA and the non-proliferation regime as such.

2.2. NNWS (as part of NWFZs, nuclear alliances or neither)
It was considered that Parties to the NPT and Parties to the treaties or agreements establishing NWFZs have already made respective concrete commitments and would just need to reconfirm them. In this context it was further noted that other States possessing NW but which have not been officially designated NWS, may have to make non-nuclear undertakings in order to qualify for NSA.

2.3. General complementary obligations/guarantees both for NWS and NNWS in terms of refraining from the threat or use of force, including conventional, against the territorial integrity, sovereignty or political independence of a NNWS.
With regard to shared obligations, the point was made that all States are bound by the UN charter and the obligation in article 2 to refrain from force or the threat of force to solve their disputes. In the context of existing NSAs states should pursue the objective to facilitate negotiation, entry into force or implementation of further complementary disarmament and non-proliferation agreements.
The question was raised that the CD has to consider who should provide assurances to whom. Two approaches to this question were mentioned: either the provision of assurances by NWS to NNWS only, or an approach, which would involve assurances provided by everyone to everyone, although possibly in an asymmetric manner.
It was noted that although Art. 2(4) UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of armed force, there was a lack of common agreement and understanding about the implications of this term, notably in connection with article 51 and the inherent right of states to self-defence. It was mentioned that in order to arrive at a global agreement on NSAs, the discussions should also focus on a commonly understood definition for what constitutes a 'threat of use of NW'. Furthermore, it was suggested to define the meaning of 'alliance with NWS' in the context of NSAs.

2.4. Obligations resulting from NSAs in terms of
2.4.1. Transparency (e.g. nuclear doctrines)
The point was made that the credibility of NSAs would depend on measures that may be put in place to promote transparency, allow verification, and address non-compliance.
Delegations mentioned that increased transparency by NWS with regard to NW capabilities, the role of these weapons in their defence postures, including thresholds of use, location of storage sites and operational status, and in the implementation of arms control agreements would be necessary to credibly assure NNWS and to build confidence both among NWS and NNWS. Many delegations stressed the need to discuss which transparency measures would be considered as basic requirements regarding NSAs.
2.4.2. Verification
Concerning verification, some delegations mentioned that it was critical for NNWS who qualify for NSA that they demonstrate continued compliance with their non-proliferation obligations through robust verification.
In this regard it was stressed that that the IAEA verification mechanism would already provide credible assurances for NWS that NNWS comply with their obligations under their safeguards agreements, and do not divert nuclear materials acquired for peaceful purposes to proscribed or unknown purposes. It

was pointed out by some delegations that a similar effective verification mechanism would be necessary to provide satisfactory assurances of compliance by NWS.
However, it was indicated the issue of a treaty's verifiability should not be taken as a hindrance to commence negotiations on such treaty.

2.4.3. Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs)

Some delegations mentioned the possibility that through NSAs, NWS would not only make commitments towards NNWS, but also among themselves, which would additionally enhance their mutual confidence and generally support CSBMs.
Many delegations argued that transparency played an important role in confidence-building and was a prerequisite for further progress in verified arms control and disarmament. In that context it was mentioned that even though ambiguity might be a part of deterrence and the respective nuclear postures, the mere dialogue on NSA could help to enhance confidence and trust – what would be especially crucial in the increasingly tense international security environment. In this regard it was noted that increased transparency by NWS as a voluntary confidence-building measure would further assure NNWS and thus could be followed up by additional CSBMs.

2.4.4. Actions in case of alleged non-compliance/sanctioning of non-compliance

It was emphasized that a verification regime adopted as part of NSAs should include mechanisms to resolve disputes, including consultations with concerned parties and that judgments on compliance should be part of a political process, but based on facts identified through verification reports.
Many delegations stressed that non-compliance and possible consequences were critical issues. In that context, some delegations mentioned that in cases of non-compliance, credible sanctions would be necessary in order to help bringing States back into compliance and thus underlined the need for stringent procedures to assess non-compliance while other delegations stressed the preventive character of NSA and that in a scenario of use of NW the question of sanctions was a hypothetical one. It was also mentioned that, given the composition of the UNSC and the prominent role of NWS therein, this body should not be involved, while others did see a role for it as there was no other authoritative body which could assume that role.
With regard to consultation mechanisms, which should provide the opportunity to clarify the circumstances of the matter, some delegations pointed out that the question on how to assess compliance would need further clarification as well as the question whether a separate instrument would be needed for that purpose or if these issues should be an integral part of effective NSAs.

3. Constraints

3.1. Reciprocity/ Conditionalities

It was acknowledged that NSAs have a certain element of reciprocity built into them notwithstanding the fact that current assurances have been extended from NWS to NNWS. They would thus come with mutual obligations both for NWS and NNWS. Some delegations held the view that NNWS could be expected to meet certain conditions to qualify for NSAs, e.g. to comply with the obligations under the NPT, not resorting to other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or not acting in alliance with a NWS. On the other side it was voiced that NNWS have a legitimate interest in unequivocal and legally binding NSAs as they voluntarily gave up their right to possess NW in the NPT framework.
In this context some delegations mentioned that – if strong evidence emerges that an NPT member State manufactured or acquired NW – it would automatically lose the coverage of NSAs as a result. In this regard some delegations noted that NSAs should be one of the benefits that NNWS can derive by being a party to the NPT, while others noted that NSAs should be unconditional as a matter of principle.

3.2. Requirements for the effectiveness of NSAs in light of attacks against vital interests

It was mentioned that the most principal mutual, legally binding NSAs could be seen in Art. 2(4) UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of armed force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. However, it was underlined that it is non-specific with regard to NW, what was also reaffirmed in the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which did not give a clear answer to the question whether the use of NW could be permitted or forbidden under international law as the lawfulness of the use of a NW in 'extreme circumstances of self defence' could

not be ruled out. Accordingly, there were different views on the legitimacy of these exceptions and caveats, notably the use of NW in such extreme situations of self defence, and the consequently possible impact on the validity of NSAs.
Accordingly, some NWS pointed out that they would consider the use of NW only under extreme circumstances purely to defend the vital interests of the country, its allies and partners and in line with their respective military doctrines. They further explained that such reservations placed on NSAs should be viewed within the overall global context and that those reservations are important to avert any aggression from other States.

3.3. Special considerations in terms of compliance with
3.3.1 NPT
Some delegations reiterated that NSAs should not be linked to a specific existing treaty and that there was no relationship between NSAs and the NPT, as the latter would neither universal, not would it include provisions on NSAs nor provide any item regarding the use of NW. Other delegations stated that they see NPT membership and compliance as a legitimate precondition for NSAs which raised questions regarding the mechanisms that are available to assess such 'compliance'.
It was pointed out that every effort would have to be made to strengthen NSAs in all aspects to inter alia prevent the proliferation of NW, but without hampering the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy by Parties to the NPT. It was also mentioned by some delegations that NWS would need to continue to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament to reaffirm their commitment under Art. VI of the NPT.
Many delegations stressed the importance of NSAs in the NPT context as attributed by action 7 of the 2010 Action Plan and the role of the CD therein and the role of the UNSC 984 resolution for the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995.
3.3.2. CTBT
Many delegations mentioned that NSAs would be complementary to the obligations of the CTBT to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any NW test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from carrying out any NW test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control. It was further mentioned that a progress on NSAs might also have a positive impact on the CTBT entry into force and universalization process.
3.3.3. FMCT
The discussions on an FMCT to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in production of fissile material (FM) for NW or other explosive devices were also seen as complementary to discussions on NSAs as both would constitute intermediary steps for nuclear disarmament. It was noted by some that NSAs could provide a good basis for further work in the CD and thus discussions on an FMCT, especially because in their view FMCT constituted the most feasible agenda item together with NSAs in the CD.

3.4. Complementary requirements for the effectiveness of NSAs in terms of
3.4.1. Asymmetric scenarios
Some delegations elaborated on the possibility of NNWS acting in concert or in a military alliance with NWS and if so, what kind of impact this would have on existing NSAs. This was also mentioned in the context of overwhelming conventional attacks, which would put the vital security interests of a State at stake. The same link was established by some delegations who questioned the eligibility of States to receive NSAs on the basis of their existing security arrangements with NWS.
3.4.2. Other WMD
It was stated that NW constitute a class of weaponry on their own due to their unparalleled destructive force. The question was raised if attacks with other WMD – chemical or biological weapons (CBW) – should or should not be included in conditions justifying the use of NW. It was acknowledged that either way, methods of warfare used to respond to CBW attacks have to be in compliance with the requirements for self defence under Art. 51 UN Charter and International Law.

The point was made that, given the constantly changing international security dynamics, NWS would have the right to review provided assurances and that such review would be conditioned on the threat, development or proliferation of WMD which could pose a threat comparable to that of NW.

3.4.3. Disruptive new technologies

It was noted that the use of NW in response to an attack using disruptive new technologies, including cyber warfare, could be considered in the light of the necessary requirements of Art. 51 UN Charter and that this must also be discussed in terms of credible NSAs.

3.4.4. Activities of non-state actors, including terrorists

Delegations discussed the issue that the obligation not to use or threaten to use NW against NNWS must extend not only to the territory of NNWS, but also to the armed forces and to non-state actors and installations under the jurisdiction and control of such States. It was mentioned that in case the State, on whose territory the non-state actor operates, would fail to comply with its obligations to prevent non-state actors from acquiring material necessary to build NW or other WMD, or this State would aid non-state actors in acquiring NW in any way, it should be held responsible under international law.

Some delegations voiced the further need for discussions on the issue of an appropriate response to nuclear terrorism in the context of NSAs.

Some delegations noted that neither of the above-mentioned scenarios would justify the use of nuclear weapons as humanitarian considerations would prohibit such use of NW and that such scenarios were against the spirit of the NPT.

4. Legal and Institutional Considerations

4.1. Legal instruments

The legitimate right of NNWS to receive NSAs was articulated by all sides. However, many delegations held the view that existing assurances were not satisfactory given their often non-legally binding nature under international law, inherent ambiguities which are open for free interpretations, and the varying qualifiers and derogations associated with them. In that context, the need for stronger and more effective assurances with fewer caveats was mentioned. The counter argument was that existing assurances were already credible, effective and thus the concerns about reservations and conditions were unsubstantiated. However, some States felt that unilateral assurances were merely statements of intention and therefore unsatisfactory because they are not irreversible enforceable commitments. Delegations thus differed in their views on the relevance of existing NSA and the perceived need for their reaffirmation as a starting point for further process. The validity of UNSC-resolution 984 was widely reaffirmed, restating that already existing NSAs would enhance trust and confidence. In this context it was mentioned by several delegations that it would be necessary to have a more focused discussion on possible legal instruments regarding additional NSAs, which could be pursued e.g. in form of political declarations, a treaty, a protocol, a convention, or a new UNSC resolution. Many delegations noted in this regard that the strongest legal instruments on NSA can be found in the protocols to the NWFZ-treaties as ratified by NWS.

It was remarked that a legally binding instrument would not present a technical challenge as it would not require a comprehensive treaty regime. Many delegations, especially NNWS, shared the view that a legally binding instrument should be universal, irrevocable, non-discriminatory, credible, and unambiguous and respond to the concerns of all parties.

4.2. Universality

Many delegations expressed the view that NSAs should be global and uniform in scope, application and interpretation in order to provide the best possible protection. It was noted that if NWS give NSAs, which vary in scope and degree of ambiguity, they would erode the efficiency of the assurances in their totality as each caveat, especially with regard to conditions and qualifications, could have the effect of neutralizing NSAs provided by the other NWS.

4.3. Regional relevance (e.g. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, NWFZs)

Most delegations acknowledged that regional relevance would be mostly derived from existing NWFZs, which set a standard for NSAs. As such they have positively contributed to global peace and security as

well as nuclear non-proliferation. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the Treaty on the South East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ) combine 115 States that have freely chosen to form these zones. Additionally, Mongolia has declared its own nuclear-weapon-free status. It was acknowledged that the commitments assumed by NWS in regard to these treaties are legally binding guarantees under international law. However, it was pointed out that the respective protocols of the Treaties of Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba, and CANWFZ have not been signed or ratified by all NWS and only Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been signed and ratified by all five official NWS – although with reservations and interpretative declarations. Many delegations stressed the need to further strengthen the regimes of the NWFZs and called upon NWS to sign and ratify all respective protocols.

Many delegations welcomed the establishment of NWFZs. NWS also expressed their support for the establishment of NWFZs, elaborated on their commitments made so far under NWFZs and stressed that those commitments were legally binding guarantees. It was mentioned that assurances have been made for more than 100 States belonging to these regions. Some NWS expressed their intention to broaden assurances by signing or ratifying the Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok.

On the question of lack of uniformity of NSAs among different NWFZs, the point was made that the NWFZs treaties and respective protocols reflected the specific regional characters, and hence could not be expected to be uniform. Therefore, it was questioned if those regional arrangements can actually substitute legally binding, universal NSAs. Some delegations called for the harmonization of the protocols of NWFZs.

A concern often voiced in this context was that the establishment of NWFZs would narrow down 'global' obligations into a 'regional' dimension. Moreover, some delegations also signaled that NNWS belonging to regions where the establishment of NWFZs proved more problematic, e.g. due to the existence of NW in those particular regions, should not be denied the entitlement to receive legally binding NSAs. Thus, it was suggested to enlarge the scope of NSAs beyond NWFZs.

4.4. Appropriate forums to pursue NSAs

4.4.1. CD

All delegations recognized the CD as the most appropriate forum with the required mandate and the technical potential to commence and carry forward negotiations on NSAs. NSAs were seen an essential building block of a comprehensive and balanced program of work in the CD. In this context, some delegations noted that legally binding NSAs constituted a mature issue, especially considering the understanding that a nuclear attack on a State that does not possess a similar response capability was widely seen as unacceptable. It was voiced that necessary steps should be taken in the CD to start to work in accordance with its mandate as soon as possible and to pave the way towards initiating multilateral negotiations on an agreement regarding NSAs.

It was mentioned that, given the intrinsic link of NSAs with the other agenda items of the CD, continued deliberations on the issue of NSAs as one of the priorities of the CD could positively impact other agenda items and would be beneficial to both NWS and NNWS.

In this regard, many delegations mentioned the need to have a comprehensive matrix aggregating all existing NSAs provided through unilateral declarations, UNSC resolutions, and the protocols of NWFZs treaties to identify a list of common elements and find the least common denominator to start negotiations of a future multilateral instrument. It was suggested that this mapping exercise could be done in two steps, firstly summarizing the technical terms as well as the factual aspects and secondly elaborating on underlying political issues and doctrines.

4.4.2. NPT

Some delegations expressed the view that NSAs could also be negotiated in the context of the NPT. However, the point was made that this would be problematic as some relevant States were not Parties to the NPT.

Nevertheless, the positive impact that NSAs could play in the maintenance and strengthening of the NPT, as the most important international non-proliferation regime, was widely acknowledged.

5. Matrix of existing NSA

The following matrix on existing NSA was elaborated jointly by JCSP and UNIDIR at the request of members of the Conference on Disarmament.

I. NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTIES TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

State	Unilateral Declarations	Protocols to Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones	Politically Binding Bilateral or Multilateral Instruments
CHINA	**(Document S/1995/265 – 6 April 1995)** *"1. China undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances. 2. China undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances. This commitment naturally applies to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the [NPT] or non-nuclear-weapon States that have entered into any comparable internationally binding commitment not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices".* **Assurance to Ukraine (Letter 4 Dec. 1994)**[1] *"...The Chinese Government has always maintained that under no circumstances will China use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. This principled position also applies to Ukraine..."* **Assurance to Kazakhstan (Letter 8 Feb. 1995)**[2] *"...The Chinese Government has unconditionally undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. This long-standing principled position also applies to Kazakhstan..."*	**Tlatelolco Treaty**: *"[The Parties] undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties."* Ratified: 2 June 1974 (Statement: *"China will never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Latin American countries and the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone...").* **Rarotonga Treaty**: *"[Each Party] undertakes not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against: (a) Parties to the Treaty; or (b) any territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol 1 is internationally responsible."* Ratified: 21 Oct. 1988 (Statement: *"...China will neither use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone nor test nuclear weapons in this region...However, the Chinese Government reserves its right to reconsider these obligations if other nuclear weapon States or the contracting parties to the Treaty take any action in gross violation of the Treaty and its attached Protocols, thus changing the status of the nuclear free zone and endangering the security interests of China.").* **Bangkok Treaty**: *""Each State Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party to the Treaty. It further undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone."* Not signed. **Pelindaba Treaty**: *"Each Protocol Party undertakes not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the Treaty or of this Protocol."* Ratified: 10 Oct. 1997.	**Joint Declaration on Mongolia's Status as a Nuclear-weapon Free Zone (20 Sep. 2012)**[3] *[The P5] "reaffirm, in the case of Mongolia, their respective unilateral negative security assurances as stated in their declarations issued on 5 and 6 April 1995, and referred to in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995, or as subsequently updated."*

		Semipalatinsk Treaty: *"Each Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device against any Party to the Treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia..."* Ratified: 17 Aug. 2015.	
FRANCE	**(Document S/1995/264 – 6 April 1995)** *"France reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the [NPT], except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on France, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, or against its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a State in alliance or association with a nuclear-weapon State".* **Assurance to Ukraine (5 Dec. 1994)[4]** *"France reaffirms towards Ukraine, as a non-nuclear state party to the NPT, its declaration made towards non-nuclear weapon states that are committed to remain so not to use nuclear weapons against them except in the case of an aggression conducted in association or in alliance with one or several nuclear-weapon state(s) against France or a state with which it has a security arrangement."* **(Speech by President François Hollande, 19 February 2015)[5]** *"France will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the [NPT] which comply with their international non-proliferation commitments in terms of weapons of mass destruction."* **(2017 Defence and National Security Strategic Review)[6]** *"Nuclear deterrence remains the cornerstone of [France's] defence strategy. It protects [it] from any aggression against [its] vital interests emanating from a state, wherever it may come from*	**Tlatelolco Treaty**: *"[The Parties] undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties."* Ratified: 22 Mar. 1974 (Statement: "[France] interprets [this] undertaking... as being without prejudice to the full exercise of the right of self-defence confirmed by Article 51 of the Charter of the [UN]...."). **Rarotonga Treaty**: *"[Each Party] undertakes not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against: (a) Parties to the Treaty; or (b) any territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol 1 is internationally responsible."* Ratified: 20 Sep. 1996 (Statement: "... [this] commitment... amounts to the negative security assurances given by France to non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the [NPT] such as they were... referred to by resolution 984 of the [UNSC]. These assurances shall not apply to States which are not parties to the [NPT].") **Bangkok Treaty**: *""Each State Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party to the Treaty. It further undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone."* Not signed. **Pelindaba Treaty**: *"Each Protocol Party undertakes not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the Treaty or of this Protocol."* Ratified: 20 Sep. 1996 (Statement: "... [this] commitment... amounts to the negative security assurances given	**Joint Declaration on Mongolia's Status as a Nuclear-weapon Free Zone (20 Sep. 2012)[7]** *"[The P5] "reaffirm, in the case of Mongolia, their respective unilateral negative security assurances as stated in their declarations issued on 5 and 6 April 1995, and referred to in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995, or as subsequently updated."*

	and whatever form it may take."	*by France to non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the [NPT] such as they were... referred to by resolution 984 of the [UNSC]. These assurances shall not apply to States which are not parties to the [NPT].")* **Semipalatinsk Treaty**: "*Each Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device against any Party to the Treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia...*". Ratified 17 Nov. 2014 (Statement: "*... [this] commitment... amounts to the negative security assurances given by France to non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the [NPT] such as they were... referred to by resolution 984 of the [UNSC]. These assurances shall not apply to States which are not parties to the [NPT].*")	
USSR **RUSSIAN FEDERATION**	**(Document S/1995/261 – 6 April 1995)** "*[The] Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the [NPT], except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State*". **(2010 and 2014 Military Doctrine)**[8,9] "*The Russian Federation reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat.*"	**Tlatelolco Treaty**: "*[The Parties] undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties.*" Ratified: 8 Jan. 1979 (Statement: "*Any action taken by one or more States parties to the Treaty... that is incompatible with its non-nuclear status, and the commission by one or more States parties to the Treaty of an act of aggression in support of a nuclear-weapon State or jointly with that State, will be considered by the Soviet Union as incompatible with the relevant obligations of those countries under the Treaty. In such cases the Soviet Union reserves the right to review its obligations...*"). **Rarotonga Treaty**: "*[Each Party] undertakes not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against: (a) Parties to the Treaty; or (b) any territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol 1 is internationally responsible.*" Ratified: 21 Apr. 1988 (Statement: "..."*In the event of any actions undertaken by the state or states, which are parties to the... Treaty, in violation of their main*	**Budapest Memorandum (5 Dec. 1994)** "*...the Russian Federation... reaffirm[s], in the case of [Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan] [its] commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an attack on [itself], [its] territories or dependent territories, [its] armed forces, or [its] allies, by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.*" **Joint Declaration on Mongolia's Status as a Nuclear-weapon Free Zone (20 Sep. 2012)**[10] *[The P5] "reaffirm, in the case of Mongolia, their respective unilateral negative security assurances as stated in their declarations issued on 5 and 6 April 1995, and referred to in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995, or as subsequently updated."*

		commitments under the Treaty connected with the non-nuclear status of the zone and perpetration by one or several states parties to the Treaty of an act of aggression with the support of a state having nuclear weapons or jointly with it with the use by such a state of the territory, air space, territorial sea or archipelago waters of those countries for calls by naval ships and flying vehicles with nuclear weapons on board or transit of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union will have the right to consider itself free from the commitments undertaken..."). **Bangkok Treaty**: ""*Each State Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party to the Treaty. It further undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.*" Not signed. **Pelindaba Treaty**: "*Each Protocol Party undertakes not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the Treaty or of this Protocol.*" Ratified: 5 Apr. 2011 (Statement: "*[Russia] will not consider itself legally bound under [this] Article... in case of an aggression against the Russian Federation, the Armed Forces of [Russia] or its other forces, against its allies or a state it is bound with by security obligations, when such an aggression is made or assisted by a non-nuclear state jointly with a nuclear state, or if the non-nuclear state is under interallied obligations to the nuclear state...*"). **Semipalatinsk Treaty**: "*Each Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device against any Party to the Treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia...*" Ratified 22 Jun. 2015.	
UNITED KINGDOM	**(Document S/1995/262 – 6 April 1995)** "*The United Kingdom will not use*	**Tlatelolco Treaty**: "*[The Parties] undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the*	**Budapest Memorandum (5 Dec. 1994)** "*...the [UK]... reaffirm[s], in*

	nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the [NPT] except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State. In giving this assurance the United Kingdom emphasises the need not only for universal adherence to, but also for compliance with, the [NPT]. In this context I wish to make clear that Her Majesty's Government does not regard its assurance as applicable if any beneficiary is in material breach of its own non-proliferation obligations under the [NPT]". **(National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015)**[11] *"The UK will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any Non-Nuclear Weapons State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This assurance does not apply to any state in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations. While there is currently no direct threat to the UK or its vital interests from states developing weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities, we reserve the right to review this assurance if the future threat, development or proliferation of these weapons make it necessary".*	*Contracting Parties."* Ratified: 11 Dec. 1969 (Statement: *"The [UK] is prepared to regard [the] undertaking... not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties to the Treaty as extending not only to those Parties but also to territories in respect of which the undertaking to apply the statute of denuclearisation, in accordance with Article 1 of Additional Protocol I, becomes effective."*) **Rarotonga Treaty**: *"[Each Party] undertakes not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against: (a) Parties to the Treaty; or (b) any territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol 1 is internationally responsible."* Ratified: 19 Sep. 1997 (Statement: *"The [UK] will not be bound by [this] undertaking... a) in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the [UK], its dependent territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by a party to the Treaty in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State; or b) if any party to the Treaty is in material breach of its own non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty."*). **Bangkok Treaty**: *""Each State Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party to the Treaty. It further undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone."* Not signed. **Pelindaba Treaty**: *"Each Protocol Party undertakes not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the Treaty or of this Protocol."* Ratified: 12 Mar. 2001 (Statement: *"The [UK] will not be bound by [the] undertaking under [this] Article... i) in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the [UK], its dependent territories, its*	*the case of the reaffirm[s], in the case of [Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan] [its] commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an attack on [itself], [its] territories or dependent territories, [its] armed forces, or [its] allies, by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state."* **Joint Declaration on Mongolia's Status as a Nuclear-weapon Free Zone (20 Sep. 2012)**[12] *[The P5] "reaffirm, in the case of Mongolia, their respective unilateral negative security assurances as stated in their declarations issued on 5 and 6 April 1995, and referred to in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995, or as subsequently updated."*

		armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by a Party to the Treaty in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State, or, ii) if any party to the Treaty is in material breach of its own non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty"). **Semipalatinsk Treaty**: *"Each Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device against any Party to the Treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia..."* Ratified 30 Jan. 2015 (Statement: *"The [UK] will not be bound by its undertaking under [this] Article if any Party to the Treaty is in material breach of its own non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty. In this context the [UK] consider that the Treaty, including its Article 12, prohibits those actions described in its Articles 3 and 5... The [UK] note that while there is no direct threat to the [UK] or its vital interests from States developing capabilities in other weapons of mass destruction, for example chemical and biological, [it] reserve[s] the right to review [its] undertaking under [this] Article... if the future threat, development and proliferation of these weapons make it necessary").*	

UNITED STATES	**(Document S/1995/263 – 6 April 1995)** *The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the [NPT] except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.*	**Tlatelolco Treaty**: *"[The Parties] undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties."* Ratified: 12 May 1971 (Statement: *"As regards the undertaking... not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties, the [US] would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon State, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party's corresponding obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty").* **Rarotonga Treaty**: *"[Each Party*	**Budapest Memorandum (5 Dec. 1994)** *"...the [US]... reaffirm[s], in the case of the reaffirm[s], in the case of [Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan] [its] commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an attack on [itself], [its] territories or dependent territories, [its] armed forces, or [its] allies, by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state."*

	(Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018)[13] *"The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. Given the potential of significant non-nuclear strategic attacks, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of non-nuclear strategic attack technologies and U.S. capabilities to counter that threat. . . [S]ignificant non-nuclear strategic attacks include, but are not limited to, attacks on the US, allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure."*	*undertakes not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against: (a) Parties to the Treaty; or (b) any territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol 1 is internationally responsible."* Signed: 25 Mar. 1996, not ratified. **Bangkok Treaty**: ""*Each State Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party to the Treaty. It further undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.*" Not signed. **Pelindaba Treaty**: "*Each Protocol Party undertakes not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the Treaty or of this Protocol.*" Signed: 11 Apr. 1996, not ratified. **Semipalatinsk Treaty**: "*Each Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device against any Party to the Treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia...*" Signed: 6 May 2014, not ratified.	**Joint Declaration on Mongolia's Status as a Nuclear-weapon Free Zone (20 Sep. 2012)**[14] *[The P5] "reaffirm, in the case of Mongolia, their respective unilateral negative security assurances as stated in their declarations issued on 5 and 6 April 1995, and referred to in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995, or as subsequently updated."*

II. STATES NOT PARTY TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

State	Unilateral Declarations
DPRK	(Press Release by the DPRK Government, 6 Jan. 2016)[15] *"The DPRK, a responsible nuclear weapon state, will neither be the first to use nuclear weapons nor transfer relevant means and technology under any circumstances as already declared as long as the hostile forces for aggression do not encroach upon its sovereignty."* (Speech by Kim Jung-un to the Workers' Party Congress, 7 May 2016)[16] *"Our republic is a responsible nuclear state that, as we made clear before, will not use nuclear weapons first unless aggressive hostile forces use nuclear weapons to invade on our sovereignty."*
INDIA	(Cabinet Committee on Security Review of Nuclear Doctrine, 4 Jan. 2003)[17] *"India's nuclear doctrine can be summarized as follows: 1) Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent; 2) A posture of "No First Use": nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere; 3) Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage. 4) Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority. 5) Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. 6) However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons. . ."* (Statement to the Conference on Disarmament, 7 May 2015)[18] *"As part of our doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence, India has espoused the policy of 'No First Use' against nuclear weapon states and non-use against non-nuclear weapon states. We are prepared to convert these undertakings into multilateral legal arrangements."*
ISRAEL	[Israel does not express public positions on this issue and abstains on the UNGA resolution calling for an international arrangement on NSAs]
PAKISTAN	(Statement to the Conference on Disarmament, 28 June 2017)[19] *"As a responsible nuclear-weapon state, Pakistan has given the unilateral unconditional pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any state not possessing nuclear weapons, and we are ready to transform this pledge into a multilateral, legally binding international instrument."*

[1] United Nations, General Assembly, Document A/49/783, 11 Dec. 1994 (http://undocs.org/A/49/783).

[2] United Nations, General Assembly, Document A/50/86, 28 Feb. 1995 (http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A%2F50%2F86&Submit=Search&Lang=E).

[3] United Nations, Letter dated 20 September 2012 of the Permanent Representative of France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America addressed to the Secretary-General, Document A /67/393–/2012/721, 20 Sep. 2012, http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/17552/A_67_393%3bS_2012_721-EN.pdf?sequence=24&isAllowed=y.

[4] ExportLaw Blog, "Security Assurances" (https://www.exportlawblog.com/docs/security_assurances.pdf).

[5] French Embassy to the United Kingdom, "France Will Not Lower Its Nuclear Guard, Vows President," 2 March 2015, http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/France-will-not-lower-its-nuclear).

[6] French Government, "Defence and National Security Strategic Review 2017", https://www.defense.gouv.fr/layout/set/popup/content/download/520198/8733095/version/2/file/DEFENCE+AND+NATIONAL+SECURITY+STRATEGIC+REVIEW+2017.pdf.

[7] United Nations, Letter dated 20 September 2012 of the Permanent Representative of France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America addressed to the Secretary-General, Document A /67/393–/2012/721, 20 Sep. 2012, http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/17552/A_67_393%3bS_2012_721-EN.pdf?sequence=24&isAllowed=y.

[8] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Russia's Military Doctrine", 2010 (http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf).

[9] Russian Embassy in London, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation", https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029

[10] United Nations, Letter dated 20 September 2012 of the Permanent Representative of France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America addressed to the Secretary-General, Document A /67/393–/2012/721, 20 Sep. 2012, http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/17552/A_67_393%3bS_2012_721-EN.pdf?sequence=24&isAllowed=y.

[11] UK Government, "National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015," Cm 9161, November 2015 (www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555607/2015_Strategic_Defence_and_Security_Review.pdf)

[12] United Nations, Letter dated 20 September 2012 of the Permanent Representative of France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America addressed to the Secretary-General, Document A /67/393–/2012/721, 20 Sep. 2012, http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/17552/A_67_393%3bS_2012_721-EN.pdf?sequence=24&isAllowed=y.

[13] US Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review 2018" (https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF).

[14] United Nations, Letter dated 20 September 2012 of the Permanent Representative of France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America addressed to the Secretary-General, Document A /67/393–/2012/721, 20 Sep. 2012, http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/17552/A_67_393%3bS_2012_721-EN.pdf?sequence=24&isAllowed=y.

[15] Lizzie Dearden, "North Korea announces 'successful hydrogen bomb test' as UN Security Council calls emergency meeting", *The Independent*, 6 Jan. 2016.

[16] Eric Tarmadge, "North Korea will not use its nuclear weapons first, Kim Jong-un tells Congress", The Independent, 8 May 2016.

[17] Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 'The Cabinet Committee on Security reviews operationalization of India's nuclear doctrine', 4 Jan. 2003 (http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/20131/The_Cabinet_Committee_on_Security_Reviews_perationalization_of_India s_Nuclear_Doctrine+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine).

[18] Delegation of India to the Conference on Disarmament, "Statement on Negative Security Assurances by Ambassador DB Venkatesh Varma, Permanent Representative of India to the CD, in the CD Plenary", 7 May 2015 (http://meaindia.nic.in/cdgeneva/?3910?000).

[19] Delegation of Pakistan to the Conference on Disarmament, "Working Group on the Way Ahead, Negative Security Assurances, 28 June 2017" (http://pakistanmission-un.org/?p=1851).